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Non-Technical Summary 
 
 
This paper focuses on the design of emissions trading schemes in practice. 
After a short introduction to the general idea of emissions trading, practical 
requirements for the introduction of an emissions trading scheme are 
considered, including the temporal and spatial dimension as well as 
administrative requirements and the role of markets. Historical developments 
regarding emissions trading are discussed briefly.  
 
Currently, the largest trading scheme is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) that aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the European 
industry by 21 percent until 2020 compared to 2005 levels.  Because of its 
prominent role, the basic design features and the process of introducing the 
EU emissions trading scheme are reviewed in more detail.  
 
Finally, the impact of the EU ETS on the regulated entities is analyzed based 
on an annual survey among German companies regulated by the EU ETS 
which is conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) in 
a common project with KfW Bankengruppe.  
 
As the survey showed, carbon dioxide abatement in Germany is currently 
achieved by energy efficiency improvements in most cases. Larger abatement 
volumes through renewal of existing production facilities can be expected to 
occur from 2020 to 2030. Even if most regulated companies currently receive 
over-allocation of freely distributed permits, about 50 percent of companies in 
Germany are active in allowance trading. With regard to future regulation, 
companies suffer from considerable uncertainty, including uncertainty about 
allocation from 2013 onwards and general uncertainty about the stringency of 
greenhouse gas regulation in Europe and beyond.  
  
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
 
In diesem Arbeitspapier werden praktische Fragen der Einführung und des 
Designs von Emissionshandelssystemen diskutiert. Nach einer kurzen 
Einleitung in die Theorie des Emissionshandels werden praktische 
Anforderungen zur Einführung eines Emissionshandelssystems näher 
beleuchtet, etwa räumliche sowie zeitliche oder administrative Anforderungen 
an ein Emissionshandelssystem.  
Derzeit ist das EU Emissionshandelssystem (EU EHS) das größte nationale 
Handelssystem für Treibhausgasemissionen. Ziel ist es den 
Treibhausgasausstoß bis 2020 um 21 Prozent im Vergleich zum Niveau von 
2005 zu reduzieren. Wegen der großen Bedeutung des EU EHS werden seine 
wichtigsten Designelemente sowie der Prozess seiner Einführung näher 
beleuchtet.  
Abschließend wird der Einfluss des EU EHS auf regulierte Unternehmen 
diskutiert. Dazu wird auf Ergebnisse von Unternehmensbefragungen 
zurückgegriffen, die das Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 
(ZEW) gemeinsam mit der KfW Bankengruppe durchgeführt hat.  
Wie die Umfragen zeigten, werden CO2-Minderungen derzeit vor allem über 
Maßnahmen zur Steigerung der Energieeffizienz erreicht. Zu größeren 
Emissionsminderungen dürfte es im Zuge von Ersatzinvestitionen erst im 
Zeitraum von 2020 bis 2030 kommen. Auch wenn die Mehrzahl der 
regulierten Unternehmen gegenwärtig über einen Überschuss an frei 
zugeteilten Emissionsrechten verfügt, nützen derzeit etwa die Hälfte der 
Unternehmen die Möglichkeit zum Handel mit Emissionsrechten. Im Hinblick 
auf zukünftige Treibhausgasregulierung besteht seitens der Unternehmen 
große Unsicherheit, etwa in Hinblick auf die freie Zuteilung ab 2013, aber auch 
in Hinblick auf das allgemeine Ausmaß und die Art der zukünftigen 
Regulierung in Europa und darüber hinaus.  
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Abstract 
This paper deals with designing emissions trading in practice. After a short 
introduction to the general idea of emissions trading, practical requirements for the 
introduction of an emissions trading scheme are considered, including the temporal 
and spatial dimension as well as administrative requirements and the role of markets. 
Historical developments regarding emissions trading are discussed. Currently, the 
largest trading scheme is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that aims to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the European industry by 21 percent until 2020 
compared to 2005 levels.  Because of its prominent role, the basic design and the 
process of introducing the EU scheme are reviewed in more detail. Finally, the impact 
of the EU ETS on the regulated entities is analyzed based on an annual survey among 
German companies regulated by the EU ETS which is conducted by the Centre for 
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1. Introduction 
 
Emissions trading is a key component of climate and environmental policy in Europe. First 
experiences with emissions trading schemes were made in the late 1970s in the US. Various 
applications for regulation by tradable permits occurred afterwards, mostly in the US. While 
emissions trading is under certain assumptions equivalent to a tax on emissions, it offers 
flexibility for policy-makers when designing policies for environmental protection. The European 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the largest GHG regulation scheme worldwide and 
started in 2005. As the EU ETS shows, emissions trading can be successfully employed to 
incentivize firms to reduce CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Emissions trading is also in the 
center of the Low Carbon Development Pilot Program (LCDPP) in five selected provinces and 
eight cities of China. 
 
Emissions trading offers the option to achieve a given emissions reduction target at least costs. 
Pigou (1920) introduced the idea of a tax to reduce negative side-effects of economic activities on 
humans, such as environmental pollution. The tax can be designed, so that the negative impact of 
pollution can be reduced in a way that harms consumers and industry as little as possible while 
maximizing social welfare. In the case of a Pigouvian tax, the actual amount of achieved 
emissions reduction is a priori unknown due to unknown marginal abatement costs of polluters. 
Emissions trading can be regarded as the counterpart of a Pigouvian tax on emissions. In an 
emissions trading scheme, policy makers exogenously set an overall limit for a pollutant and 
assign permits to each unit of the pollutant. Emissions permits can be traded freely between 
regulated firms. As a consequence, a price for each unit of emissions occurs on the market. 
Crocker (1966) and Dales (1968) discussed tradable permits for the cases of air and water 
pollution. Baumol and Oates (1971) and Montgomery (1972) proved theoretically that regulation 
under tradable permits can yield an efficient allocation of resources, i.e. it is able to cut back 
effluents or emissions from various sources under an exogenously given overall 
quantityrestriction at least costs. The basic difference between a tax and an emissions trading 
scheme is that in the case of a tax a price per unit emissions is announced by policy-makers, while 
in the case of an emissions trading scheme, an overall amount of allowed emissions is set by 
policy-makers. As shown by Downing and White (1986), both schemes can offer adequate 
incentives for emitters for green innovations and to reduce emissions efficiently.  
 
In this article we look at the designing of emissions trading in practice. We briefly describe the 
elements for the use of emissions trading and the European experiences with its emissions 
trading scheme. Chapter 2 describes the general aspects of emissions trading and summarizes the 
requirements for a successful introduction in practice. In Chapter 3, we briefly discuss the 
evolution of different emissions trading schemes, e.g. in the USA or Chile. In Chapter 4 we 
describe the evolution of the EU emissions trading scheme and its most important aspects. 
Chapter 5 presents an overview of firms responses to the EU emissions trading scheme, based on 
the experiences made in Germany in the past years. Finally, in Chapter 6, a brief conclusion is 
drawn. 
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2. Designing Emissions Trading in Practice 
 
A central feature of quantity regulation is that the regulator defines a fixed amount of allowed 
emissions for the whole economy (or the regulated area) for a certain period of time. The 
quantity restriction is often referred to as “cap”. The period in which emissions are restricted is 
often called “compliance period” or “commitment period”. To assure that the overall quantity 
restriction is not exceeded, the regulator assigns permits to each unit of emissions. These permits 
are distributed to regulated entities and must be surrendered (handed in to the regulator) for each 
emitted unit.  
 
2.1. Allocation of Permits 
 
Permits can be sold or auctioned by the regulator or can be partly or fully distributed for free 
(known as “grandfathering”). In the case of selling or auctioning, the regulator generates revenues 
which can be “recycled” or “redistributed”, for example, to reduce other taxes. It was shown that 
revenue recycling can lead to an increase in social welfare compared to non-recycling (Goulder et 
al. 1997). Free allocation of permits (grandfathering), in contrast, is an implicit subsidy for 
regulated entities. The allocation of permits distributes the cost burden of the required emission 
reduction among firms, sectors and households, which are affected through prices on emission in 
the emissions trading system. With auctioned permits, the scarcity rents go to the government 
and the distributional consequences are largely the same as with an emission tax. With 
grandfathered permits, the scarcity rents are given to the firms. This offers an incentive for 
companies to accept an enforceable constraint on emissions. The allocation of permits, however, 
has no direct impact on the permit price on the market under general assumptions, i.e. if firms 
that receive free allocation are aware of the opportunity costs that would arise from not valuing 
the free allocation at the market price. 
 
2.2. Emissions Trading in Time 
 
While compliance is organized within a certain period (e.g. one year), meaning that regulated 
entities must surrender permits for verified emissions at the end of the period, banking or 
borrowing of permits between the compliance periods can increase flexibility in the trading 
scheme. Banking of permits occurs when regulated entities are allowed to hold back permits for 
compliance in the future. Intermediaries in the permit market can generate special products like 
futures or options when banking is allowed. Banking can not only occur at the level of regulated 
entities or intermediaries but also at the level of the regulating authority. The regulating authority 
can bank permits over time and build a permit reserve. If permits are freely allocated, a reserve 
might be necessary to provide free allocation to entities that newly enter into regulation. If 
permits are auctioned or sold to regulated entities, the regulator can build a permit reserve and 
sell additional permits to the market in times of high demand to avoid large upward price 
volatility. Borrowing is the counterpart to banking. In that case permits from future compliance 
periods are borrowed for current compliance. Borrowing incurs the risk of excessive borrowing 
which could lead to non-compliance in the future. Because of the perverse incentives that can 
stem from borrowing, it is often starkly restricted in practice. While, for example, banking is 
allowed within the EU ETS over the whole period 2008 to 2020, borrowing is restricted from 
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year to year. Regulated entities receive free allocation in February each year, while permits must 
be surrendered in April. Hence, implicit borrowing from next year’s free allocation for current 
year’s compliance is possible. The modest borrowing provision in the EU ETS increases 
flexibility while preventing excessive borrowing.  
 
2.3. Emissions Trading in Space 
 
Spatial aspects of environmental regulation depend on the nature of the regulated emissions. For 
example, the concentration of effluents in a river or the concentration of SO2 in the air is 
perceived locally (downstream of the river or in the periphery of a coal fired power plant). When 
local pollutants (like SO2) are addresses, emissions stay in a certain area, and hence, must not 
exceed a specified amount in a certain period. In such a case, a trading scheme has to be designed  
in a way that assures that the concentration of a pollutant or emissions from regulated sources in 
a regulated area (e.g. county)  stay below a targeted level which can imply restrictions on 
purchasing additional permits from outside the regulated area as well as banking or borrowing 
within the region. Emissions trading systems may otherwise violate local air quality goals and may 
lead to the concentration of emissions in certain areas (hot spots). Examples are the US Offset-
Policy, starting in 1976, and the US Acid Rain Program, starting in 1980. In the former, achieved 
reduction of pollutants were tradable. In the latter, emission permits were allocated to sources 
and banking was allowed (see Chapter 3). In contrast, the emissions of greenhouse gases, like 
CO2, are expected to have an impact on global climatic conditions. When global pollutants like 
greenhouse gases are addressed, the spatial and timely occurrence of emissions is of less 
importance. Greenhouse gases, for example, stay in the atmosphere for a long time and are 
widely diffused (fully mixing). They are harmless on the local level and at the time they are 
emitted, at least if the concentration is not extremely high. However, the global stock of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is expected to have an impact on overall climatic conditions 
in the long run. 
 
2.4. Administrative Requirements 
 
For an emissions trading scheme to be maintained, a regulating authority is required that allocates 
permits or verifies emission offsets, assures that emissions are properly monitored and reported, 
manages a permit registry to assure that each permit is surrendered only once so that the overall 
“cap” is not exceeded, traces transactions in the registry to document property rights, and 
enforces compliance, e.g. imposes a fine on regulated entities in the case of non-compliance. 
Compared to a regulation by prices (unit tax), a quantity approach (tradable permits) is more 
complex in terms of administration. The most important difference is the permit registry which is 
needed for regulation by quantities. Within the registry each market transaction of permits must 
be recorded. In the case of emissions offsets (reducing emissions compared to a baseline) the 
authority must verify the offset and allocate the offset permits.  
 
2.5. The Role of Markets 
 
Quantity regulation by emissions trading is often referred to as a market based approach. The 
price that incentivizes emitters to reduce economy-wide emissions is generated by supply and 
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demand on markets. Reduction efforts by companies are not defined by the regulating authority 
as under a command and control regime. Hence, liquid and transparent markets are of great 
importance. Transparency in markets (about prices and traded volumes) is beneficial as it 
provides information to all market participants. In the US SO2 trading program, prices for private 
transactions were unknown to others and hence assessing a “fair” price was accomplished with 
relatively high informational costs. The market was not very liquid meaning that finding a 
potential seller/buyer was accomplished with search costs. These factors lead to relatively high 
transaction costs in general and hampered the efficient exchange of permits and the efficiency of 
the emissions trading system as such. Since the price is generated at primary auctions or sells 
(initial permit allocation by authority) and at secondary markets (exchanges over the counter 
trade), liquidity and transparency within the market is crucial for minimizing transaction costs and 
facilitating efficient exchange of permits. Allowing intermediaries to be active in permit trading 
can play a crucial role here. Also markets for machinery and equipment to achieve emissions 
reductions can be of importance. While in the case of SO2 trading, retrofitting of existing plants 
to reduce emissions was relatively easy, technical solutions for the reduction of CO2 are more 
complex because of the non-existence of end-of-pipe technologies for CO2 emissions. If markets 
for energy efficient machinery and equipment are sticky, transaction costs can hamper the 
effective transformation of the economy (Heindl, 2011). 
  
2.6. Regulation under Uncertainty 
 
If there is full information, i.e. no uncertainty about the benefits and costs that are related to the 
regulation of a harmful substance, there is no difference between price (tax) and quantity 
(emissions trading) regulation. In practice, this would imply that it is perfectly known what price 
(unit tax) yields which quantity (emissions reduction) and vice versa. Since there is usually 
uncertainty about the exact costs and benefits of regulation, the decision is usually made under 
uncertainty. Weitzman (1974) presented a model that accounts for uncertainty in the choice of 
the regulation scheme. Basically he finds that prices (unit tax) should be preferred over quantities 
(tradable permits) if the slope of marginal costs for providing environmental quality is steeper 
than the slope of marginal benefits and vice versa. The steepness of marginal costs and benefits 
defines the relative importance of one variable over the other. Newell and Pizer (2003) showed 
that regulation by prices (unit tax) would be preferable in the case of greenhouse gas regulation. 
Roberts and Spence (1975) were the first who considered mixed regulation by prices and 
quantities for the case of effluents. They conclude that a mixed system of permits and prices is 
more efficient than a scheme with either permits or prices alone. They also point out that the 
additional fee motivates polluters to approximate the expected damage function more closely. 
Pizer (2002) argues that a mixed system of price and quantity controls is preferable to a system 
with pure quantity controls in the case of greenhouse gas mitigation. In a first-best setup, a price 
approach should be chosen. However, recognizing the importance of quantity targets for the 
political feasibility of international agreements (Nordhaus, 2006), a quantity targets with a certain 
“trigger price” for the issuance of additional permits (to restrict prices) would improve welfare 
compared to a pure quantity approach.  
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3. Past Experiences with Emissions Trading 
 
The first practical experience with quantity based regulation schemes for pollutants were made in 
the USA. In the early 1970s the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) evaluated the 
feasibility of market based approaches for environmental regulation. In 1976 the EPA started the 
“Offset Policy”, an early approach with tradable offset permits amongst regulated sources in 
regions that did not meet ambient air quality standards, so called nonattainment areas. Firms were 
allowed to create emissions reduction credits (ERCs) by reducing its emissions below a baseline 
level. ERCs were tradable between firms and within the firm, meaning that emission permits are 
transferable from one installation to another. Because targeted emissions were local pollutants, 
the USA was divided in 247 air quality control regions. States had to develop State 
Implementation Plans (SIP), which must be approved by EPA. The SIPs defined how the state 
intended to meet EPAs ambient air quality standard, whose sources were regulated and defined 
the amount of a given pollutant that a regulated source was allowed to emit (Hahn and Hester, 
1989).  
In addition to the Offset Policy, the Bubble Policy allowed firms to include various sources of 
emissions under one regulatory scheme. The Bubble Policy hence helped to reduce overall 
regulatory costs. Firms were also allowed to bank permits, which increased flexibility. Netting 
allowed firms to increase emissions at one source within a plant while avoiding the classification 
of the source as a “major emitting source” when emissions were decreased at another source and 
the net increase in emissions did not equal to a major source. The EPA also applied a scheme of 
tradable permits to phase out lead of gasoline (Hahn and Hester, 1989; Nussbaum, 1992). As a 
consequence of the Montreal Protocol that targeted the phase-out of Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) and Hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), the USA implemented a trading scheme in 
1988.  
Beginning in 1990 the sulfur trading scheme under Title IV of the “Clean Air Act”, an US law 
specifying environmental policies, entered into force. The sulfur trading program extended 
existing command and control policies and delivered sizeable increases in regulatory efficiency 
(Hanemann, 2009). The Nox Nudget Programm aimed to reduce seasonal Nox emissions in the 
Northeastern USA and started in 2003. Also regional trading schemes were implemented like the 
“Regional Clean Air Incentives Market” (RECLAIM) in California or the “Chicago Emissions 
Reduction Market System” (Tietenberg, 2006). Howe (1994) reviewed environmental regulation 
in the USA and Europe. The USA tended to use market based approaches to environmental 
regulation and mainly quantity based approaches rather than taxes since the mid-1970s. The 
European Countries, on the other hand, implemented mainly command and control policies and 
showed little interest in the use of tradeable permits.  In 1992 an emissions trading scheme for 
particulate matter (PM10) was installed in Santiago de Chile (Montero et al, 2002). In 1997 the 
parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed on 
the Kyoto Protocol that mandates a reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of about five 
percent on average until 2012 compared to 1990. GHGs are global pollutants that are expected 
to contribute to global climate change. With the Kyoto Protocol, two trading schemes were 
established: First, an international emission trading scheme that allows countries with GHG 
emission targets (Annex B countries) to trade “Assigned Amount Units” (AAUs) in compliance 
with the Kyoto Protocol. Second, two project-based offset schemes, Joint Implementation (JI) 
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and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). JI allows for crediting of achieved emissions 
reductions in Annex B countries and the CDM allows for crediting of achieved emissions 
reductions in Non-Annex B countries (developing and least developed countries). International 
emissions trading was expected to significantly reduce the costs of compliance under the Kyoto 
Protocol (Böhringer and Löschel, 2002). In 2011 New Zealand started a domestic GHG treading 
scheme. In Japan there are local GHG trading schemes in Tokyo and the province of Saitima. In 
the USA and Canada there are several local GHG trading schemes, like the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) which is active since 2008. Other schemes like the Western Climate 
Initiative (WCI) and the Midwest GHG Reduction Accord (MGGRA) are scheduled and 
expected to start in 2012.  
 
 
4. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) currently is the largest GHG regulation 
scheme worldwide (Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010). About 11,000 industrial installations located in 
30 countries are covered by the scheme (the EU27, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland). The first 
trading phase, scheduled for 2005 to 2007, was intended as a test phase and was characterized by 
generous free allocation of permits. In the second phase, scheduled for 2008 to 2012, free 
allocation was reduced, but free allocation of at least 90 percent of permits is obligatory for EU 
Member States. With the start of the third trading phase from 2013 to 2020, allocation rules will 
be changed. Free allocation will be completely phased out for electricity producing facilities. The 
remaining facilities will receive free allocation based on product benchmarks. Free allocation shall 
be phased out entirely until 2027. The overall aim of the EU ETS is to achieve a reduction of 
GHG of 21 percent versus 2005 until 2020. To achieve the targeted emissions reduction, the 
overall cap on emissions will be decreased by 1.74 percent each year, starting in 2013.  
 
4.1. Origin and Design of the EU ETS 
 
Convery (2009) and Ellerman et al. (2010) discuss the origin of the EU ETS. We focus on the 
most important milestones here to illustrate the political process of establishing the EU ETS. 
Initially the EU was in opposition to a market based approach in the Kyoto Protocol and 
planned to install a community wide carbon and energy tax. First efforts to install a community 
wide carbon and energy tax were made in 1992, but the proposal was finally withdrawn in 1997. 
One reason for this was the resistance of EU countries to shift tax competencies to the European 
level. Rather, the EU defined internal country specific emissions reduction targets in the Burden 
Sharing Agreement in 1998 to meet the Kyoto obligations and welcomed a quantity based 
approach. In 2000 the Green Paper on Emissions Trading was released, summarizing options to 
implement an emissions trading scheme in Europe. The ETS Directive was drafted in 2001 and 
finally adopted in 2003. Since the Emissions Trading Directive focused on the Europe-wide 
trading scheme, the European Commission drafted a separate Directive to link the EU ETS to 
the project based offset mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, defining the options for using 
permits from the CDM and JI in the EU ETS in addition to domestic permits, called European 
Emissions Allowances (EUAs). The Linking Directive was agreed in 2004. Because there were 
different positions on how to include CDM and JI in the EU ETS, the ultimate decision to define 
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quantity restrictions for the use of offset permits from the CDM or JI was left to the member 
states. 
 
The ETS Directive (Directive 2003/87) defines the regulated activities and the type of regulated 
emissions in Annex I. From 2005 onwards the Directive stipulated only the regulation of carbon 
dioxide (CO2) from combustion installations, mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, metal ore 
roasting and sintering, pig iron and steel production, cement and clinker production, glass 
manufacturing, ceramic and bricks manufacturing as well as pulp and paper production. By doing 
so, many branches of the European economy remain outside the regulation of the trading 
scheme, like the transportation sector or the agricultural sector. Those sectors are often referred 
to as “non-traded sectors”. In general, the EU ETS covers roughly 50 percent of CO2 emissions 
in Europe and approximately 40 percent of GHG emissions, respectively. A downstream 
approach was chosen since pure upstream regulation in the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
would have effectively lead to double taxation of many products and would have partly removed 
the fiscal autonomy of the member states. EU member states have autonomy with regard to fiscal 
policy and many countries already had taxes, e.g. on fuel, in place. The regulatory framework set 
out in the ETS Directive is hence motivated by practical concerns and the requirements of the 
political architecture of the European Union, rather than concerns of economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness of the scheme. However, the ETS directive explicitly considers an 
extension of the EU ETS to the transport sector for the future, recognizing its importance in 
contributing to greenhouse gas reductions.  
 
The ETS Directive states that each member state shall develop a “National Allocation Plan” 
(NAP) for each trading period based on “objective and transparent criteria”, listed in Annex III 
of the Directive. The NAPs define the amount of freely allocated EUAs to each installation in 
the respective member state. The EU Commission has the right to reject a NAP. The allocation 
of permits in the EU ETS is characterized by free allocation (grandfathering) in its first two 
trading periods. In the first period from 2005-2007, at least 95 percent of permits had to be 
allocated for free, according to the Directive. For the period 2008-2012, at least 90 percent of 
permits must be allocated for free. Permits have to be handed out to installations by the national 
authorities by 28 February each year. Firms have to surrender permits for compliance by 30 April 
each year. While the Directive does not allow for borrowing of permits in general, the allocation 
rule actually enables firms to borrow permits from their next year’s free allocation for current 
compliance. This one-year ahead implicit borrowing increases flexibility of firms and help to 
reduce potential distortions on the markets for permits due to excess demand around the 
compliance date. To ensure compliance with the EU ETS, the Directive defines a fine, posed to 
regulated firms that do not surrender a sufficient amount of permits. For each emitted ton of 
carbon dioxide for which a firm has not surrendered a permit, it is liable to a financial penalty of 
EUR 40 for the period 2005 to 2007 and EUR 100 from 2008 onwards. Paying the fine does not 
release firms from the obligation to surrender the respective permits.  
 
Information about the freely allocated EUAs, the verified emissions and surrendered permits of 
regulated installations are available to the public. The Community Independent Transaction Log 
(CITL) database provides the information online. In addition, each national authority in the 
member states runs a registry, where regulated installations and their emissions data can be 
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viewed online by the public. Each person or firm is allowed to hold permits under the premise 
that it has an account at a national authority’s registry. Within the registries, exchange of permits 
is documented so that the person or firm holding a permit can be identified. Member states have 
to report to the EU Commission each year, first to collect emissions data and second to control 
the general implementation of the trading scheme in the member states. Annex IV and V of the 
ETS Directive defines principles for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions. 
Detailed MRV rules were developed for each technology since 2003. In Germany the 
competencies are shared between the federal states (Länder) and the German Emissions Trading 
Authority (DEHSt). The Länder are responsible for the permission of installations and the 
validation and approval of the monitoring plans which describe the methods used for calculating 
CO2 emissions. They also randomly check installation-specific issues in the emission reports. A 
verifier validates and verifies the emission reports by installations and reports the amount of 
emissions to the DEHSt. The DEHSt checks the emission reports more closely to ensure 
compliance and is responsible for enforcement and sanctioning. 
 
4.2. First and Second Trading Phase (2005 to 2012) 
 
Ellerman et al. (2010) provide a detailed analysis of the first trading phase of the EU ETS (2005 
to 2007). In general, the first trading phase was characterized by generous free allocation of 
permits. It is important to note that European Emissions Allowances (EUAs) from the first 
trading period could not be transferred to the subsequent periods. This underlines the test-
character of the first trading period. While firms had to fully comply with the scheme’s rules like 
specified in ETS Directive, EUAs from the first period were only valid for compliance in the first 
trading period. The EU ETS was scheduled as a decentralized trading scheme, combining the 
schemes of the EU member states. Ellerman et al. (2010) points out that the EU ETS shows a 
much higher degree of decentralization as any previous trading scheme, like the US SOx trading 
scheme or the Nox budget trading program. Each member state had to develop its own National 
Allocation Plan (NAP). The overall cap, consisting of the sum of capped emissions from the 
member states, was ex ante unknown. In addition, when the NAPs were developed, countries 
could possibly treat installations differently, meaning that installations could receive a different 
amount of free allocation in different countries which might raise fairness issues. Since the first 
trading period did not seek to reduce emissions in the first place, but rather phase-in the trading 
scheme, the cap was planned to be set close to business-as-usual (BAU) emissions (Ellerman et 
al., 2010). However, exact data on BAU emissions were not available, e.g. in Germany (Matthes 
and Schafhausen, 2007), or were not reliable, as in the case of Sweden (Zetterberg, 2007). Hence, 
authorities in charge for developing the NAPs partly relied on voluntary submitted emissions 
data from industry, which set incentives for the industry to over-report.   
 
As a consequence, there was a net surplus of allowances in the first trading period which was ex-
ante unknown to regulated firms. When allowance trading started in 2005 prices were between 
EUR 20 and EUR 30 per ton of CO2, showing relatively high volatility. When the first year of 
trading ended and the first verified emissions data in the EU ETS were published, prices dropped 
sharply from EUR 29.43 on 24 April 2006 to EUR 10.90 on 2 May 2006. Regulated companies 
became aware of the allowance surplus in the scheme, when verified emissions where published 
for the first time. This event is known as “compliance break”. It outlines the importance of the 
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test phase of the EU ETS when the scheme was introduced. Towards the end of the trading 
phase, prices for emissions allowances eligible for the first phase converged to zero. The reason 
for that is simply that permits from the first trading period were not eligible for compliance in the 
second trading period and the scheme was oversupplied with emissions permits.  
 
With the start of the second trading phase in 2008, also the commitment period to the Kyoto 
Protocol started. The overall cap was decreased in the EU from 2,299 MtCO2e per annum in the 
years 2005 to 2007 to an annual maximum of 2,083 MtCO2e in the years 2008 to 2012. Free 
allocation was slightly decreased compared to the first trading period. The EU member states 
were asked to allocate a minimum of 90 percent of emissions permits for free to regulated 
installations. From 2008 onwards, permits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI) were also eligible for compliance for installations regulated under the 
EU ETS. While permits from CDM (Certified Emission Reductions – CERs) and JI (Emission 
Reduction Units – ERUs) were only moderately used in the start of the second trading phase, 
usage speeded up gradually in the years 2009 and 2010. However, the usage of permits from 
CDM and JI is limited in the EU ETS. Each EU member state individually decides how much 
permits can be used for compliance. In Germany, for example, installations can surrender 
permits from CDM and JI up to 22 percent of received free allocation. Table 1 summarizes 
overall usage of permits from CDM and JI in Europe and Germany.  
 
Table 1: CERs und ERUs Usage for Compliance in the EU ETS (Million Permits) 
 
 2008 2009 2010 Total (2008-2010) 
EU-wide      
CERs (from CDM) 82.5  77.9  116.9  277.3 
ERUs (from JI) 0.05 3.2  20.1  23.35 
Germany     
CERs (from (CDM) 23.7 26.0  33.4  83.1 
ERUs (from JI) 0 0.67 4.2  4.87 
Source: CITL (2011), CDC (2011) 
   
 
4.3. Perspectives on Emissions Trading in Europe from 2013 onwards 
 
With the start of the third trading phase of the EU ETS in 2013, several changes will apply to the 
EU ETS. New sectors will be regulated. The biggest one is the aviation sector, which will already 
be added to the scheme in 2012. In 2013 new stationary installations from sectors producing bulk 
organic chemicals, hydrogen, ammonia, and aluminium will be opted in to the EU ETS. While 
only CO2 emissions were covered by the scheme until 2012, N2O emissions from the production 
of nitric, adipic, and glyocalic acid production as well as perfluorocarbons from the aluminium 
sector will be covered by the scheme (EU, 2010b). The Netherlands and Austria included some 
N2O emissions from specific installations already in the second trading period of the EU ETS. 
The most relevant change for existing installations from 2013 onwards will be the revised free 
allocation rules. Auctioning will be the principle of allocation from 2013 onwards. In practice, 
auctioning will progressively replace free allocation from 2013 onwards and grandfathering shall 
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be completely phased out until 2027 (see Table 2). Over the third trading period from 2013 to 
2020, about half of the issued European Emissions Allowances shall be auctioned (EU, 2010). 
Also the way how free allocation is organized will change. From 2013 onwards, free allocation 
will be based on product specific performance measures. To do so, the EU Commission 
developed product benchmarks. In practice, free allocation will be orientated on the performance 
of the ten percent most energy efficient installations in a certain product group (see Table 3). 
This implies that less efficient installations will receive far less free allocation from 2013 onwards. 
 
 
Table 2:  Sectors and Allocation Principles in the EU ETS form 2013 onwards 
 
Activity / Sector Allocation Rule 
Electricity Generation No more free allocation 
Heat  Free allocation 
Industrial Sectors and Subsectors which are deemed to 
be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage (EU, 
2010b) 
100% free allocation based on benchmarks from 2013 
to 2020 
Industrial Sectors (remaining) 80% free allocation based on benchmarks in 2013, 
falling to 30% in 2020 
Source: EU, 2011 
 
 
Table 3: Benchmarks and their Estimated Coverage of Emissions 
 
Activity / Sector Benchmark 
Electricity Generation None 
Heat Generation Heat-benchmarks (approx. 20% of emissions) 
Industry Product benchmarks (approx. 75% of emissions) 
 Fuel benchmarks (approx. 5% if emissions) 
 Process emissions (approx. less than 1% of emissions) 
Source: EU, 2011 
 
 
Apart of the reduced amount of freely allocated permits, the EU-wide amount of issued permits 
(“cap”) will be decreased annually by a linear factor of 1.74 percent. In practice, this will result in 
an annual reduction of the overall EU-cap of 37.4 MtCO2 for stationary sources. The cap for the 
year 2013 is determined at 2,039 MtCO2. An amount of 107 MtCO2 for newly opted  sources in 
2013 is included in the 2013 cap (EU, 2010b). The EU, however, will determine the exact cap 
finally in 2013. Until 30 September 2011, the national authorities of the EU member states shall 
work-out the plans for revised free allocation from 2013 onwards and submit their “national 
implementation measures” (NIM) to the EU Commission. The commission is expected to review 
the NIMs in the course of 2012. Hence, it is likely that the concrete figures for free allocation will 
be available at best a few months before the start of the third trading period in March 2013. This 
practice leaves firms with a relatively high degree of uncertainty.  
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5. The German Experience – Evidence from the KfW/ZEW CO2 Barometer 
 
The Centre for European Economic Research is annually surveying all German companies 
regulated by the EU ETS on their behavior under the trading scheme in a common project with 
KfW Bankengruppe. In the survey, topics like abatement efforts, trading activities and issues 
related to carbon management and organizational responds of firms to the EU ETS are 
addressed. The firm-level survey data are merged with emissions data from the Community 
Independent Transaction Log (CITL), allowing an identification of larger and smaller emitters 
based on verified official data from the EU. The data are aggregated from the installation to the 
firm-level. In the CITL there are 1,668 regulated installations identified for Germany. After 
aggregation, 816 firms can be identified. From the survey additional information on the firms are 
available, e.g. the number of employees and the main activity based on the NACE classification. 
The firm-level data gathered at ZEW in the years 2009 to 2011 describes the firm-behavior of 
German firms in the EU ETS and gives empirical evidence on the transformation towards the 
third trading period of the EU ETS. 
 
5.1. Abatement 
 
For the years 2009 and 2010, 63 percent of surveyed German firms said that they already had 
implemented CO2 abatement activities since the start of the EU ETS in 2005. Small and medium 
sized companies (< 250 employees) and small emitters (< 25,000 tCO2 emissions p.a.) are less 
active in abatement than larger companies or larger emitters. In March 2010 57 percent of 
emitters planned to implement abatement activities until the end of 2012. In March 2011 65 
percent of companies stated that they plan abatement from 2013 onwards, implying slightly 
increasing overall abatement activities in the third trading period. Abatement activities carried out 
between 2005 and 2010 were in most cases not scheduled to achieve CO2 reductions in the first 
place. Abatement mostly occurred as a side-effect of other measures, including general 
restructuring and optimization of production processes. 25 percent of companies state that from 
2013 onwards activities with the primary reason of CO2 abatement will be scheduled, implying an 
increasing impact of the EU ETS on economic activities in Germany, caused by the stricter rules 
in the EU ETS and higher carbon price from 2013 onwards.  
One important determinant of CO2 abatement is the technical lifecycle of existing installations 
under regulation. While existing installations might be optimized to reduce emissions, the 
achievable reductions are limited. One reason is the non-existence of end-of-pipe technologies 
for carbon dioxide abatement. Under existing regulation firms might take carbon emissions into 
account when it comes to new investment in machinery, replacing existing installations. As a 
consequence, considerable emissions reductions might be achieved by replacing existing 
installations by more energy efficient ones. Based on that, German firms were asked about the 
remaining average life-cycle of existing installations in their machinery portfolio. 82% of 
emissions stem from installations with an average remaining technical life-cycle of 15 to 20 years. 
Accordingly, carbon dioxide abatement through investment in energy efficient new machinery 
might only occur to a relatively large extent in the long run (see table 4).  
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Table 4: Average remaining technical life-cycle of existing installations in Germany  
 
Average remaining life-cycle 
(evaluated in 2011) 
% of companies % of current emissions 
Up to 5 years 8 % 0,6 % 
5 to 10 years 20 % 4,8 %  
10 to 15 years 19 % 3,3 % 
15 to 20 years 28 % 81,9 % 
20 to 30 years 14 % 7,3 % 
30 to 40 years 1 %  < 0,02 % 
More than 40 years 10 % 2,1 % 
Source: Löschel et al. 2011 
 
Current abatement activities are mostly based on process optimization. In March 2011, 63 
percent of surveyed firms said that emissions reductions were achieved in this way. 59 percent 
also invested in energy efficient technology. Fuels-switch was used by 26 percent of respondents 
and renewable energy sources by 25 percent. One option to reduce emissions is, of course, the 
reduction of output by firms. For the year 2009, during the financial and economic crisis, 20 
percent of firms stated that they had achieved emissions reductions by reducing output. The 
statement corresponded to the overall figures for CO2 emissions in Europe, which dropped in 
2009 compared to previous years. After the German economy recovered in 2010, emissions rose 
again. As a consequence, only 9 percent of firms reported the reduction of output as a reason for 
declined emissions for the trading year 2010.  
 
5.2. Allowance Trading 
 
Trading of allowances was carried out in a similar frequency by regulated companies in Germany 
in the tradingyears 2009 and 2010. 51 percent of surveyed firms traded allowances in 2009 and 54 
percent in 2010 respectively. About two-thirds of the companies only trade once per year, the 
remaining firms trade more than once per year. Very large emitters also choose to trade daily or 
weekly. In contrast, small emitters (< 25.000 tCO2) usually trade once per year or, in rare cases, 
quarterly or biannual. Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in trading activities of firms 
with an overall surplus or net short position of freely allocated allowances. This gives evidence 
for intra-firm or intra-trust exchange of permits and borrowing. In fact, 77 percent of firms with 
more than one regulated installation prefer to exchange permits internal, rather than using 
markets or exchanges in the first place. Only 23 percent of firms usually clear internal short/long 
positions generally via the market. Most companies prefer to trade allowances via intermediaries, 
like carbon funds or banks. The second most frequent way of trading are over the counter (OTC) 
transactions. Only a relatively small number of firms trade directly at exchanges. The preferred 
way of trading is dependent on the annual emissions levels. Smaller emitters tend to trade via 
intermediaries or OTC. Only relatively large emitters directly trade at exchanges.  
 
5.3. Companies Response to Changes in the EU ETS from 2013 Onwards 
 
Some of the regulated companies are particularly struggling with the uncertainty of planning that 
stems from the lengthy drafting process of the actual reforms. 72% of the interviewed companies 
in Germany have tried to estimate the volume of the new allocation from 2013 by March 2011. 
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However, the information base for such estimations remains rather limited. It seems that 
approximately 63% of all interviewed companies expect an insufficient allocation of certificates 
from 2013. By comparison, only 27% of all respondents suffered from insufficient allocation in 
2010. As a consequence, many companies will have to expect substantial additional expenditures 
from 2013 due to emissions trading. While the additional expenditures for smaller emitters will be 
limited, bigger emitters will face additional expenditures of several hundreds of thousands of 
euros. Very large emitters even have to expect additional costs amounting to millions of euros, 
especially in the energy sector where the most reductions to the free allocation will be made. 
 
Indeed, for a transformation towards a low greenhouse gas European economy, it is necessary to 
set clear incentives for CO2 reductions by means of a price signal. This fact is widely accepted 
within the German economy. However, given the extensive reforms, the companies must be 
sufficiently informed and need enough time for an adequate preparation for the changes to come. 
This is clearly a weak point of the European climate policy. The interviewed companies stated 
that they would need an average of 20 months between the announcement of the actual free 
allocation from 2013 and the enactment of the regulations in order to be perfectly prepared for 
the changes. This seems reasonable, since many companies will have to plan for substantial 
additional costs. In reality, the preparation phase for the companies is likely to be way shorter. It 
depends on the assessment procedure that the EU commission will apply to the propositions for 
free allocation made by the German Emissions Trading Authority, but most likely the allocation 
will be known only a few months ahead. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Emissions trading offers the chance for Europe to achieve its emissions reduction commitments 
in an economically efficient way, meaning at least costs. In addition to that, regulated companies 
are provided with a great amount of flexibility. Firms with high costs of carbon dioxide 
abatement are allowed to buy additional emissions allowances, while companies with relatively 
low costs of carbon dioxide abatement have incentives to reduce emissions. In the course of that, 
the overall emissions reduction target can be achieved with certainty because of the Europe-wide 
fixed amount of allowed emissions. Based on the German experience, firms in general respond 
very well to the regulatory scheme. Most firms already have started to implement CO2 abatement 
measures and abatement activities are expected to increase in the future. The EU emissions 
trading scheme was introduced gradually, starting with a “test phase” from 2005 to 2007, a period 
of moderate regulation from 2008 to 2012 and increasing regulatory pressure from 2013 onwards. 
This way to introduce the trading scheme actually turned out to be of great use for regulated 
firms as well as for policy makers. Firms were able to adapt to the new regulation and policy 
makers were able to adjust the scheme based on gathered experience and data. Despite the fact 
that emissions trading plays a key role for Europe to efficiently reduce its CO2 emissions, some 
criticism remains. Most importantly, firms are confronted with ongoing reforms in the EU ETS 
and climate policy in Europe. Uncertainty about future regulation can actually hamper investment 
in new technology and has a negative impact on the overall efficiency of the emissions trading 
scheme.  
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